1.Introduction

Nearly a year after Bill No. 4,675/2025 was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies, and following at least two years of intense debate on the pros and cons of ex ante regulation applicable to gatekeepers in digital markets, Brazil’s regulatory agenda on this issue is entering a new phase. On July 2, 2026, the bill’s rapporteur, Representative Aliel Machado (PV/PR), presented a Substitute Bill (“Substitute Bill”) containing several changes to the framework originally proposed.

Among other modifications, the Substitute Bill revises the criteria and procedures applicable to designation and to the imposition of special obligations. Some of these changes narrow the scope of regulatory intervention or provide additional procedural requirements. The resulting framework retains certain features found in international initiatives, including the European Digital Markets Act, the United Kingdom’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, and Japanese regulatory models, while adopting a distinct institutional and procedural structure.

Beyond the detailed analysis of the original draft available in “The New Bill on Digital Markets in Brazil: Agents with Systemic Relevance and Possible Obligations”^[1], the comparative table appended to this article identifies the principal changes introduced by the substitute bill^[2].

2. Structural Changes

The Substitute Bill preserves the core feature of the original proposal: the incorporation into Law No. 12,529/2011, the Brazilian Competition Law, of a specific regime applicable to digital markets. While the original text already established a specialized body within the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) – initially named the Superintendence of Digital Markets (SDM) – the Substitute Bill renames it the Special Superintendence for Systemic Relevance, Free Competition, and Consumer Protection in Digital Markets (hereinafter “SRLC”). Although the Substitute Bill modifies certain elements of the proposed institutional structure, it maintains a dedicated framework for the designation and regulation of economic agents considered systemically relevant in digital markets. CADE would remain responsible for administering and enforcing the new regime through a specialized internal structure.

The Substitutive Bill also authorizes the establishing of a Digital Markets Competition Advisory Council to support CADE in matters relating to competition in the digital economy. At least half of the Council’s members must represent academic, scientific or research institutions, or nonprofit civil society organizations engaged in competition, the digital economy, consumer protection, digital rights or innovation. The Council’s statements, recommendations and reports would not be binding on CADE. Accordingly, the Council would have an advisory role, while decision-making authority would remain with the agency.

3. Regulatory governance: mechanisms for accountability, public participation, and technical improvement.

The Substitute Bill also modifies the regulatory governance provisions contained in the original proposal. New Article 87-J requires CADE to establish participatory mechanisms in proceedings and procedures relating to digital markets. These mechanisms may include public consultations, public hearings, technical meetings, expert opinions and submissions from interested parties. By upgrading these tools, the bill formally binds CADE to a participative ex-ante rulemaking process, similar to that of a traditional regulatory agency. The provision also requires participants to disclose their economic, institutional or representative interests, as well as relevant relationships, funding arrangements or other forms of support connected with their participation.

In parallel, the bill provides for appropriate channels and procedures for the receipt and confidential handling of information, in compliance with legal confidentiality requirements. The text recognizes that the effectiveness of public participation depends on the ability to submit relevant technical, economic, and commercial information without compromising the protection of trade secrets and sensitive data.

The Substitute Bill also creates a digital market analysis procedure under Article 87-K. This non-enforcement procedure would allow CADE to assess the competitive dynamics of digital markets, ecosystems, services, or activities. It may be used to identify characteristics, trends, and factors that could affect competition; inform designation proceedings; guide the establishment, review, or revocation of specific obligations; and evaluate the effectiveness, proportionality, and competitive effects of measures already imposed. In this way, the Substitute Bill adds a tool for continuous regulatory learning to the Brazilian framework.

The Substitute Bill states that its conclusions do not, by themselves, result in the designation of an economically significant agent, the imposition of special obligations, or the application of sanctions.

The Substitute Bill also provides that a digital market analysis is not a mandatory preliminary stage, an admissibility requirement or a condition for initiating designation or special-obligation proceedings. CADE may therefore initiate such proceedings without first completing a market analysis.

4. Designation and Imposition of Special Obligations: Highlights

The Substitute Bill maintains, in general terms, the three-tiered procedural system already established in the original bill: the process for designating systemically important economic agents, the process for establishing special obligations, and the sanctioning process for any noncompliance with those obligations.

However, significant changes have been introduced, notably:

(i) designation decisions and special obligations must refer to specified digital products, services or categories;

(ii) the requirement to notify all transactions involving systemically relevant agents is replaced with an information obligation for certain non-notifiable transactions;

(iii) CADE is required to comprehensively analyze and weigh all the qualitative designation criteria during its assessment; and

(iv) the list of prohibited practices (negative obligations) was expanded to include rules against “dark patterns,” expressly forbidding interface designs or operations that subvert user autonomy, decision-making, or free choice.

Accordingly, the Substitute Bill clarifies that designation does not automatically result in the imposition of special obligations. Substantive obligations must be established in a separate proceeding. As a result, designated economic agents would not necessarily be subject to the same obligations. CADE would determine, in each proceeding, which obligations apply to the products, services or categories covered by its decision. This shift is consistent with the international trend toward tailor-made regulation, most explicitly observed in the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition, and Consumers Act. This approach also aligns with the European and Japanese models, which–despite their different institutional architecture–link regulatory oversight to previously defined services, categories, or functionalities.

The Substitute Bill also requires designation decisions to identify the products, services or digital platforms relevant to the designation. The Special Superintendence’s preliminary position must indicate, even on a preliminary basis, the products or services that support the proposed designation. CADE’s Tribunal must identify in its final decision both the factual grounds for designation and the products or services associated with those grounds.

Although the designation continues to apply to the whole economic group, this requirement introduces a key element of material limitation, reducing the risk that systemic relevance will be asserted in an overly abstract manner. A practical example of this dynamic can be seen in the DMA: while the European Commission designated Apple’s entire corporate group as a gatekeeper, its actual regulatory interventions strictly target specific services, such as App Store, that serve as important gateways. Consequently, adjacent services within the group, such as Apple Maps and Apple Adds, are excluded from the scope of obligations^[3].

The same occurred with Microsoft^[4]: while the corporate group is designated as a gatekeeper, its strict ex-ante obligations are legally confined to its specifically identified Core Platform Services (CPS)–namely, Windows and LinkedIn. Other prominent services within Microsoft’s ecosystem, such as Bing, Edge, and Microsoft Advertising, were explicitly excluded from designation.

In sharp contrast, under the German model set forth in § 19a of the GWB, the designation applies to the entire economic group and encompasses various activities within its ecosystem, even when not all of them, taken individually, were decisive in establishing its significance. Thus, services such as iCloud, Apple Music, and Apple TV+, in the case of Apple; or Prime Video, Amazon Music, and Audible, in the case of Amazon, may remain subject to further action by the Bundeskartellamt due to the broad designation applied. Under the proposed wording for the Brazilian model, these services would tend to fall outside the initial scope if the designation decision identified only, for example, iOS and the App Store, or Amazon Marketplace as the applicable products or services. Their inclusion would therefore require specific justification regarding the relevance of each service; a mere connection to the same economic group would not be sufficient.

4.1. Designation of a systemically relevant agent

The Substitute Bill retains the main quantitative parameters of the original bill: total worldwide annual revenue exceeding R$ 50 billion or annual revenue in Brazil exceeding R$ 5 billion. The innovation lies in the provision for annual adjustment of these amounts in line with the IPCA index, which provides greater stability over time for the thresholds and reduces the risk of regulatory lag.

With regard to the qualitative criteria, the Substitute Bill preserves the logic of multifactorial analysis but reorganizes the criteria to emphasize operations in multi-sided markets, network effects, integration into digital ecosystems, dependence on third parties, access to and combination of relevant data, and acting as an access controller.

Another important change concerns the period of validity and revision of the designation. The period of valid designation is reduced from ten to six years, and the Substitute Bill now expressly provides for the possibility of a review two years after the CADE Court’s decision, through a new administrative proceeding, when there are significant changes in the market that indicate a material change in the competitive conditions that justified the designation. This provision is well-suited to the dynamics of digital markets, where cycles of innovation, market entry, expansion, or the loss of relevance of certain services can rapidly alter the competitive position of market participants.

4.2. Imposition of Special Obligations on Systemically Relevant Agents

In the process of establishing special obligations, the Substitute Bill reinforces the requirement of proportionality. CADE must consider innovation, particularly with regard to small businesses, and the public interest associated with the competitive development of digital markets. These new parameters aim to prevent excessive intervention, especially when a regulatory obligation may affect legitimate functions and innovative business models.

The Substitute Bill also improves legislative technique by organizing special obligations into three categories:

(i) obligations related to transparency, information, and reporting;

(ii) positive obligations; and

(iii) obligations of abstention.

This systematization makes the framework more comprehensible and helps to define the regulatory provisions to be imposed in each case.

Among the substantive changes, one that stands out is the replacement of the mandatory filing of all mergers carried out by systemically relevant agents with a solely informative obligation. This obligation would apply to those transactions that do not meet the legal criteria for mandatory notification to CADE. This solution preserves transparency regarding strategic moves by designated entities, while avoiding overburdening the competition authority with mandatory notifications of transactions with low anti-competitive potential. Crucially, this informative system operates alongside CADE’s call-in powers, which allow the authority to demand formal review of any transaction if competition concerns arise.

Regarding obligations, the Substitute Bill adds a new ground for abstention, related to the deterioration of the conditions or quality of services provided to business or end users who exercise their rights that arise from special obligations. Furthermore, it also prohibits the designated agent from making it excessively difficult to exercise such rights, including through non-neutral design choices or interfaces capable of undermining users’ decision-making autonomy. This provision addresses contemporary concerns regarding regulatory avoidance practices, manipulative design, and the real-world weakening of the effect of legally guaranteed rights.

5. Voluntary Proposals of Special Obligation

The Substitute Bill also introduces a voluntary proposal mechanism, enabling the party targeted by the proceedings to proactively shape its special obligations. The proposal may include an implementation plan, technical parameters, operational measures, monitoring mechanisms, compliance timelines, or other measures designed to ensure the law’s objectives are met. Although non-binding, this mechanism fosters technically calibrated and realistic solutions, steering the procedure toward co-regulation and regulatory dialogue. Crucially, unlike the Terms of Commitment to Cease (TCC)–which are reactive instruments designed to resolve investigations into alleged anticompetitive conduct– this mechanism is entirely preventive. It operates independently of any suspected antitrust violations, serving solely to help design, adapt, or refine ex-ante obligations.

6. Simultaneous processing of the designation and obligation-imposition proceedings.

The original bill permitted designation proceedings and special-obligation proceedings to be processed simultaneously. The Substitute Bill retains this possibility but requires a reasoned finding of urgency related to the promotion or protection of competition. Accordingly, CADE would need to provide a specific justification before combining the two proceedings. In the absence of such urgency, designation and the imposition of special obligations would proceed separately.

7. Deadlines and Procedures

Finally, the Substitute Bill revises the procedures for designating a relevant agent and establishing special obligations.

Accordingly, CADE would need to provide specific justification before combining the two proceedings. In the absence of such urgency, designation and the imposition of special obligations would proceed separately. A complaint filed by the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring (SEAE), or by any federal government agency or entity with jurisdiction over digital markets or the protection of diffuse and collective rights, will trigger the immediate initiation of an administrative proceeding.

After initiation, the respondent will be notified to file a response within thirty days, which may be extended by up to ten days.

In the specific case of a designation, the initiation of the proceeding will be accompanied by the opening of a call for input, also for a period of thirty days, allowing third parties to submit contributions since the beginning of the investigation. Once the statements have been received, the SRLC may forward the case directly to the Court if it deems further investigation unnecessary, or it may order additional investigative measures. Upon completion of the investigation, the SRLC must publish a preliminary opinion, which will be subject to a public hearing before the final opinion is drafted and the case file is forwarded to the Court.

Regarding procedural deadlines, the Substitute Bill distinguishes between designation proceedings and proceedings to establish special obligations. In designation proceedings, any supplementary investigation must be completed within 30 days–a non-extendable period; whereas in proceedings to establish special obligations, this deadline may be extended once for an equal period. The bill also increases the maximum deadline for the automatic referral of case files to CADE’s Tribunal from 180 days to 210 days for designation or review of designation proceedings, and to 240 days for the establishment or review of special obligations. Once at the Tribunal, the reporting commissioner must place the case on the court’s agenda within 60 days in the case of designation, and within 120 days in the case of the establishment of special obligations. The Substitute Bill also regulates requests for viewing, limiting them to 30 days, granting them collective status, and requiring the automatic inclusion of the rapporteur’s vote in the subsequent session.

8. Noncompliance proceedings and sanctions

The Substitute Bill retains the provision for a specific administrative proceeding to investigate noncompliance with the special obligations imposed on systemically relevant agents in digital markets. It also limits CADE’s supplementary regulatory authority regarding deadlines and procedures. The bill states that supplementary regulations may not establish new obligations, sanctions or designation criteria beyond those provided by law.

Noncompliance with these special obligations may result in the application of the penalties already provided for in Law No. 12,529/2011 for violations of economic order, including fines ranging from 0.1% to 20% of gross revenue, as well as a daily fine in the event ongoing infractions.

Additionally, the Substitute Bill introduces continuous monitoring mechanisms, including the periodic submission of compliance reports by designated agents and the option to engage, at the company’s expense, an independent auditor selected or approved by CADE. As a result, the regime combines enforcement through sanctions with typical regulatory compliance tools.

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^[1] MOTTA, Ricardo; DRUMMOND, Luiz Felipe. The New Bill on Digital Markets in Brazil: Agents with Systemic Relevance and Possible Obligations. [S. l.]: Grinberg Cordovil Advogados, 18 set. 2025. Disponível em: https://gcalaw.com.br/the-new-bill-on-digital-markets-in-brazil-agents-with-systemic-relevance-and-possible-obligations/.

^[2] Available at: APPENDIX – BILL 4.675 (4)

^[3] EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Commission decision of 23 April 2025 designating Apple’s iPadOS as a core platform service pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector. Case DMA.100014. Brussels: European Commission, 2025. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/digital_markets_act/cases/202612/DMA_100014_163.pdf

^[4] EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Commission Decision of 5 September 2023 designating Microsoft as a gatekeeper pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Cases DMA.100015 – Online search engines; DMA.100028 – Web browsers; DMA.100034 – Online advertising services). Brussels: European Commission, 2023. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/digital_markets_act/cases/202416/DMA_100015_700.pdf

O conteúdo Deputy Aliel’s Substitutive Draft of the New Bill on Digital Markets in Brazil: scope restriction, social contribution, and voluntary agreement. aparece primeiro em Grinberg Cordovil Advogados.

The first measure took effect on July 22, 2026, imposing an additional 25% tariff on certain products originating in Brazil. The measure represents the outcome of an investigation initiated by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) on July 15, 2025, based on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, aimed at investigating Brazilian practices that allegedly restrict U.S. trade. Several products were excluded from the scope of the measure, including certain agricultural and food products, coffee, fuels and minerals, precious metals, computers, pharmaceuticals, and aeronautical items. Products already subject to sector-specific tariffs imposed under Section 232 of U.S. law also remained excluded.

The second measure, implemented on July 23, 2026, stems from an investigation aimed at determining alleged shortcomings in preventing and combating forced labor. According to the U.S. authority, Brazil and 53 other economies have neither established nor adequately enforced mechanisms to prohibit these practices. As a result, an additional tariff of 12.5% was proposed on imports from these countries.

Taken together, the two measures raise the surcharge on a portion of Brazilian exports to 37.5%. The sectors most affected include footwear, machinery and equipment, parts and components, apparel, and certain chemical products.

The Brazilian government contested the findings of both investigations, arguing that the grounds presented by the USTR do not justify the imposition of tariffs. In response to the 25% tariff, it announced the initiation of the procedures provided for in the Economic Reciprocity Act (Law No. 15,122/2025). The eventual adoption of countermeasures, however, will depend on the conclusion of the administrative proceeding and the deliberations of the Interministerial Committee on Negotiations and Economic and Trade Countermeasures. In addition, the Brazilian government announced that it would file a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) to challenge the measures.

Given the recent performance of bilateral trade, the United States was the second-largest destination for Brazilian exports in 2025, accounting for approximately 11% of Brazil’s total export value. Although the macroeconomic impact on the Brazilian economy is likely to be limited, the sectoral and regional effects could be significantly more pronounced, since the surcharges are concentrated on certain industrial segments, affecting more intensely regions whose economic activity depends on these sectors.

O conteúdo The U.S. imposes new tariffs on Brazilian products, and Brazil files a complaint with the WTO aparece primeiro em Grinberg Cordovil Advogados.

On June 16, 2026, GECEX Resolution No. 906/2026 was published, which, among other matters, addresses public interest interventions of a political nature. Although this provision already existed in Decrees No. 8,058/2013 and No. 10,839/2021, which regulate the application of antidumping and countervailing measures, respectively, GECEX Resolution No. 906/2026 clarifies the existence of this possibility and establishes that such interventions must be duly justified. In this context, GECEX has the authority to suspend or reduce trade defense measures recommended by the Department of Trade Defense and Public Interest (Decom). These interventions may be subject to a request for reconsideration, first submitted to GECEX and, if the decision is not revised, to the Strategic Council of the Foreign Trade Chamber.

In addition, GECEX Resolution No. 906/2026 also stipulates that it is the responsibility of the Foreign Trade Chamber’s Committee on Trade Defense and Public Interest to discuss and seek clarification on proposals for intervention in trade defense measures in cases where a public interest review proceeding is underway—a scenario that may also justify public interest interventions in trade defense decisions.

The Internal Rules of Procedure for this Committee were published on June 25 via GECEX Resolution No. 922/2026. The Committee does not have a deliberative function, but is an integral part of the CAMEX structure designed to support the decision-making process of the CAMEX Strategic Council and GECEX on matters of trade defense and public interest. It is composed of representatives of the members of the CAMEX Executive Management Committee.

The Rules of Procedure divide the Committee’s responsibilities into two main areas. With regard to trade defense, Article 2 provides that the Committee may examine, debate, and seek clarification on recommendations concerning the imposition, extension, modification, suspension, or resumption of antidumping and countervailing duties, safeguard measures, and price undertakings, as well as other measures related to the administration, implementation, and collection of trade defense measures.

With regard to matters of public interest, Article 3 provides that the Committee may analyze recommendations concerning, among other issues, the suspension of the enforceability of definitive antidumping and countervailing duties, the non-imposition of provisional duties, the imposition of duties at levels different from those recommended in trade remedy investigations, the approval of price undertakings, the reinstatement of suspended measures, and requests for reconsideration or administrative appeals related to these matters.

Resolution No. 922/2026 also establishes internal deadlines for the Committee’s operations, particularly in Articles 10 and 11 of the Internal Rules of Procedure. In addition to the rules on convening and holding meetings, Article 11 provides that matters submitted to the Committee for consideration must be supported by opinions, technical notes, or equivalent documents. Article 13, in turn, provides for the publication on the CAMEX website of the tentative annual meeting schedule, the actual dates of the meetings held, and a record of the topics discussed.

According to the Rules of Procedure, the Committee’s meetings shall be confidential, and preparatory documents, recommendations, reports, and discussions may not be disclosed prior to the adoption of the relevant administrative acts by the decision-making authorities.

O conteúdo New Resolutions Regulating Trade Remedy and Public Interest Procedures aparece primeiro em Grinberg Cordovil Advogados.

The USTR (Office of the United States Trade Representative), the U.S. trade authority, has published new updates regarding the investigation conducted under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 against Brazil. The investigation was initiated on July 15, 2025, and covers Brazilian practices related to digital trade and payment methods, including Pix, preferential tariffs, anti-corruption practices, intellectual property, access to the ethanol market, and illegal deforestation.

On June 1, 2026, the USTR concluded that certain Brazilian practices were unreasonable or discriminatory and would burden or restrict U.S. trade. As a result, it proposed imposing an additional 25% tariff on all goods originating in Brazil. The proposed measure has broad application, covering all Brazilian products, except for those expressly excluded in the report. Among the excluded products are, for example, beef and beef offal; vegetables and fruits; coffee; teas and spices; food preparations and beverages; minerals, ores, and fuels; metals and precious stones, such as gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and rhodium; computers and parts; and certain aeronautical items, such as aircraft engines, parts, and components.These products were excluded because they are considered strategic by the U.S. government.

The next milestones in the investigation focus on the public consultation phase: the deadline for requests to participate in the hearing was June 22, 2026; written comments may be submitted until July 1, 2026; and the public hearing will take place on July 6, 2026.

At the same time, there is an investigation into forced labor, launched on March 12, 2026, covering 60 countries, including Brazil. On this front, the USTR is assessing the absence or inadequacy of bans on the import of goods produced, in whole or in part, using forced labor.

On June 2, 2026, the USTR proposed an additional 12.5% tariff on products from the economies under investigation, including Brazil. Requests to participate in the hearing are also due by June 22, 2026; written comments must be submitted by July 6, 2026; and the hearings will begin on July 7, 2026, with an additional five-day period following the last day of the hearings for rebuttal comments.

These timelines indicate that the adoption of measures against Brazil could be formalized as early as the second half of this year, and in the worst-case scenario, they would amount to an additional 37.5% tariff.

O conteúdo U.S. Proposes Additional Tariffs on Brazilian Products Under Investigation Under Section 301 aparece primeiro em Grinberg Cordovil Advogados.

This request represents an important first step following the execution of a Concentration Control Agreement (ACC), on October 16, between the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and the Oben Group as a condition for approving Oben’s acquisition of Terphane.

Based on a study conducted by CADE’s Department of Economic Studies (DEE-CADE) and responses to requests for information from companies operating in the sector, Reporting Commissioner Victor Fernandes concluded that the maintenance of anti-dumping measures on imports of PET film would constitute a significant barrier to imports into Brazil.

According to the Commissioner, those measures would hinder the entry of new competitors, increase the cost to importers of BOPET sourced from the producing regions and reduce the competitiveness of imports in the domestic market.

In light of these considerations, the parties negotiated the ACC that foresee the following undertakings regarding anti-dumping measures[2]:

1. To request the immediate termination of anti-dumping duties on imports of BOPET from Peru, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Mexico;
2. To not request the reinstatement of suspended anti-dumping duties on imports of BOPET from China, or the renewal of anti-dumping duties on imports from China, India, and Egypt;
3. To not request the initiation of new investigations for the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of BOPET from India, Egypt, Peru, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, China and Mexico, for a period of five years.

The ACC also stipulated that the merged company may not require exclusivity from distributors operating in Brazil, or make use mechanisms that could lead to tariff or non-tariff alterations that would increase the cost of imports of BOPET. Existing countervailing measures were not addressed or limited by the ACC.

As highlighted in the decision, this outcome reflects an important institutional dialogue between CADE and the Trade Defense Department of the Secretariat for Foreign Trade (DECOM/SECEX/MDIC) which aims at promoting effective competition in the Brazilian BOPET film market and address the competition concerns identified.

[1]  https://www.in.gov.br/web/dou/-/circular-n-64-de-18-de-novembro-de-2024-596563079

[2]https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?HJ7F4wnIPj2Y8B7Bj80h1lskjh7ohC8yMfhLoDBLddZsvmjZILDQspDmgL9xEemz0O_q0-emljCBhE2YV9cwoZvaRGYPRD-sjXLwiCairnp1PQ7lSbsrIvxE1xVhRikr

O conteúdo PET Film producer requests termination of anti-dumping duty sunset review following agreement approved by CADE aparece primeiro em Grinberg Cordovil Advogados.

In the first panel, DECEX explained how works the coordination between the Federal Revenue and the Foreign Trade Intelligence Group – GI-CEX, and the non-automatic licensing regime. GI-CEX produces reports and receives charts. However, the measures from each sphere are independent, respecting their autonomy and competence. The licensing regime can be an effective measure in combating fraud since licensing occurs before customs clearance, and the importer must wait for the importation goods release.

Another front is the action against false declaration of origin, which is conducted based on an investigation opened after a complaint from the domestic industry, importers, or ex-officio (in this case, the Government verifies data that only it has access to). In these cases, Secex may also communicate with authorities from other countries.

The Federal Revenue, in turn, highlighted customs risk management and enforcement and control actions within the scope of clearance. The main customs frauds are fraudulent intermediation and imports under-invoicing. Today, there is a difficulty in identifying frauds, as they are more complex and overlapping. However, it was noted that the RFB has automated systems that verify data and detect potential irregularities, which help in the investigation of illegal activities.

Despite technological advances and systems integration, the authorities highlighted the important role of companies from each sector in identifying fraud and other illicit activities. Given their expertise and close monitoring, businesses and sectoral entities are able to detect possible frauds more quickly and accurately. For this reason, they reinforced the promotion of complaint channels and dialogue with the authorities, if necessary.

O conteúdo Comex: Secex and Federal Revenue of Brazil announce joint efforts aparece primeiro em Grinberg Cordovil Advogados.

The new ordinance revokes art. 5 of SECEX Ordinance No. 13/2020, which determined the obligation to carry out a public interest assessment in original investigation, and to extend and update for this type of trade defense process the one already established for end-of-period reviews.

Thus, as of 03/15/2023, the opening of the public interest assessment related to antidumping and countervailing duties will depend on an analysis to be carried out by the Department of Trade Remedies (Decom/Mdic), based on questionnaires submitted by interested parties in period accounted from the initiation of the investigation (same period applicable for the

submission of the importer’s questionnaires). Decom’s decision on opening the procedure must then be disclosed at the time when its preliminary conclusions on the trade remedy investigation will be published.

The rule still does not admit the opening of public interest assessment based exclusively on a request presented by a foreign producer or exporter, or any of its related parties.

In the context of the Brazilian trade remedy system, the trend is that the removal of the obligation to make public interest assessment based on original investigations will reduce the occurrence of this type of procedure, and reduce the workload of the trade remedy authority, especially with complete processes to be despite the inexistence of interested parties contrary to the trade remedy measure, or in which the elements of public interest do not have solid grounds. It is worth remembering that this rule applies to public interest assessment that may occur concurrently with dumping and subsidies investigations, and that requests for independent public interest assessment are only accepted in extraordinary cases.

O conteúdo Public interest assessment procedure is no more mandatory aparece primeiro em Grinberg Cordovil Advogados.